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IN THE 
SUPEEME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN LEACH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
NORMA B. ANDERSON and 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Omitting the various irrelevancies, innuendos and 
arguments contained in Appellants' statement of facts, 
a simple statement follows. 
Norma Anderson, a business woman in her own 
right (R.155), as grantor, created an irrevocable trust 
with Valley Bank and Trust Company, as trustee, on 
November 12, 1968 (R.61-67). On that date she trans-
ferred to NAVALCO, the nominee of the trustee, the 
trust assets, both real and personal as set out in the 
schedules attached to the Trust Agreement (R.68-71). 
The trust assets included all shares of Mrs. Anderson 
in the family corporations in which she owned a ma-
jority interest (R.171) and also her personal residence 
(R.183). The financial statement of Mrs. Anderson 
CASE NO. 
13808 
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dated July 6, 1968, showed her assets of about $610,-
000.00, and a net worth of about $465,000.00 (E.98). 
On April 15, 1969 Mrs. Anderson guaranteed pay-
ment of a promissory note of Angi Corporation, one 
of the Anderson family enterprises, in favor of John 
Leach, respondent. On November 29, 1971 the District 
Court of Salt Lake County in Civil Action 192,293 
awarded judgment to respondent for the principal 
amount of the note, interest, attorneys' fees and costs. 
On March 24, 1972 respondent commenced his ac-
tion against Mrs. Anderson and Valley Bank and Trust 
Company, as trustee, to collect the judgment (E.111). 
On August 7, 1974 District Judge James A. Sawaya gave 
judgment in favor of respondent against appellants for 
$14,680.68, interest and costs (R.17). The Conclusions 
of Law on which this judgment was based recite (1) 
that the Anderson Trust Agrement was for the use and 
benefit of Norma Anderson, the Grantor; (2) that as 
to the personal property therein, the Trust Agreement 
is void as to respondent as a creditor under Section 
25-1-11 U.C.A., and (3) that because of the spendthrift 
provision in the Trust Agreement which provides that 
no interest of Norma Anderson in the trust shall be 
liable to her creditors or subject to legal process, the 
trust is void as to the claim of respondent as a creditor 
(R.21). 
Appellants have appealed from this latter judg-
ment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
AliGI JMKNT 
POINT I 
AS TO THE PEBSONAL PROPERTY 
THEREIN, THE ANDERSON TRUST IS 
VOID AS TO RESPONDENT AS A CRED-
ITOR UNDER SECTION 25-1-11 U.C.A. 
The District Ceur; :•• hi \\n\i as t;o personal prop-
erty in the Andersn:/ Trust, the Trust Agreement was 
void as to respondent as a creditor of the grantor under 
Section 25-1-11 U.C.A., which follows: 
"Trust for grantor void - All deeds, gifts, con-
veyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or 
written, of goods, chattels, or things in action 
made in trust for the use of the person making 
the same shall be void as against the existing or 
subsequent creditors of such person." 
This statute is a part of the Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act, Title 25, Chapter 1, UCA 1953, and it supplements 
the preceding sections of the act. I ts purpose is to spell 
out protection for creditors of the grantor who has used 
the more devious route of debt avoidance by means of a 
trust. The title of the section is "Trust for Grantor 
Void", and it is aimed expressly at the "trust for the 
use of the person making the same". It makes such trusts 
void as to existing and subsequent creditors as to per-
sonal property in the trusts. 
Section 25-1-11 UCA is a codification of the gener-
al principles of law as to trusts created for the benefit 
of the grantor. 98 ALE 1211 Protection of creditors, 
existing and subsequent, is the prime concern of the stat-
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ute, and proof of fraudulent intent, insolvency or discre-
tion in trustee are immaterial. 
Scott on Trusts, Vol. 11, Sec, 156, p. 1092 states: 
"It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his 
own property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but 
can prevent his creditors from reaching it." Scott, p. 1094, 
specifically cites Sec. 25-1-11 UCA as a statutory em-
bodiment of this general principle. The Anderson trust 
is in fact restated by Scott at Sec. 156.2, p, 1099: 
"Where by the terms of the t rust the trustee 
is to pay the settlor as much of the income and 
principal as the trustee may in his absolute dis-
cretion determine, and as to any income and 
principal not so paid there is a gift over to such 
persons as the settlor may appoint and in de-
fault of appointment to the settlor's estate, his 
creditors can reach the whole of the trust prop-
erty. (Citing Cooke Trust Co, Ltd. v. Lord, 41 
Hawaii 198 (1955) and ALI Restatement of 
Trusts 2d, Sec. 156). Clearly the policy which 
prevents a person from creating a spendthrift 
trust for his own benefit also prevents him from 
depriving his creditors of a right to reach the 
trust property by creating a discretionary trust." 
Appellants have argued that the Anderson Trust 
created vested interests in children and grandchildren 
and that those interests should be superior to and in-
sulated from the claims of creditors of Mrs. Anderson. 
Sec. 25-1-11 UCA looks solely at the grantor's lifetime 
benefits and use of trust property, and disposition on 
death of grantor is immaterial under the statute. In 
any event, under the Anderson Trust, the grantor re-
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tained the option to vary final disposition by the pro-
visions of Paragraph VI of the Trust Agreement (R.92). 
There on sale of family stocks, as approved by the grant-
or, the grantor could then determine whether the sale 
proceeds should go to one or another of different 
classes of beneficiaries. Under this provision there could 
be no vesting of any interest since the Grantor retained 
a future option. 
! 
Defendants have cited DiMaria v. Bank of Californ-
ia, 23 Cal. App. 2d 254, 46 Cal. Rptr. 924, (1965) as a case 
on all fours with the Anderson Trust because of a weak 
grantor with a profligate child in each situation. The 
DiMaria case was an attempt by a creditor, who had been 
the attorney of the grantor, Mrs. Walton, in an unsuc-
cessful action by the grantor to avoid her irrevocable 
trust, to reach trust assets for payment of his fee. No 
statute such as Sec. 25-1-11 UCA was involved and no 
spendthrift clause was in the Walton Trust. The Cali-
fornia court allowed DiMaria, the creditor, to reassert 
his claims on a proper showing of discretionary powers 
in the Trustee. The court, in fact, reasserted the law re-
garding grantor's benefit trusts as set out in Green-
wich Trust Co. vs. Tyson, infra, and Sec. 156, ALI Re-
statement of Trusts 2nd, infra, saying: 
"Under these circumstances it is understandable 
why the court should conclude that the trustee 
was a mere subterfuge to insure against the un-
bridled financial demands of the settlor and at 
the same time insulate his estate against the just 
claims of creditors.'' 
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Vesting was not at issue or involved in the DiMaria case. 
Sec. 21-1-11 UCA is crystal clear in its language and 
meaning. Respondent is a subsequent creditor, and under 
the statute he should be able to reach trust assets to the 
extent of the personal property included. 
POINT II 
THE TRUST AGREEMENT PROVIDES 
FOR THE PRIMARY USE AND BENEFIT 
OF THE GRANTOR 
The Trust Agreement gives the grantor full lifetime 
benefits from the trust property. The instrument speaks 
for itself. 
The following clear cut benefits and uses for Norma 
Anderson, the grantor, of the trust estate are set out in 
the following cited paragraphs of the Trust Agreement 
(R.88-97). 
1. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall pay to or for the 
benefit of the Grantor such portions of the income and 
principal of this trust as may be necessary to maintain 
the grantor in a reasonable standard of living after tak-
ing into consideration other income received by the 
grantor. In determining the standard of living to be 
maintained, the Trustee shall use as a rule of guide the 
standard of living of the grantor of the date of the ex-
ecution of this agreement." (R.88). 
2. Paragraph II. "Trustee shall provide for a new 
automobile for the grantor approximately every two or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
three years, and then only on the request of the grantor" 
(Emphasis ours) (R.88). 
3. Paragraph II . "Trustee shall further provide for 
vacations for the grantor and a companion to be selected 
by the grantor." (R.88). 
4. Paragraph II . "Trustee shall provide sufficient 
funds to maintain grantor's home." (R.88). 
5. Paragraph II . "With relation to the home of 
Grantor, the Trustee shall sell said home at such time 
as requested to sell by the grantor and thereafter pro-
vide for the grantor reasonable accomodations after tak-
ing into consideration grantor's health and the degree of 
care that may be required to maintain her in a comfor-
table and reasonable standard. Distributions shall be 
made from time to time as trustee deems provident, but 
not less frequently than quarterly." (Emphasis ours) 
(R.88). 
6. Paragraph VI. "The trustee shall retain gran-
tor's family home until Grantor shall indicate that she 
no longer desires to live in the same or until it would 
be provident in Trustee's sole discretion to remove gran-
tor permanently from the home and place her in sur-
roundings where proper care can be administered." (Em-
phasis ours) (R.92). 
7. Paragraph VI. The Trustee shall retain as in-
vestments stock in Chuck Wagon Corporations and An-
derson Enterprises, Inc., in which corporations Norma 
Anderson has admitted to have owned controlling in-
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terests. If it becomes necessary to liquidate either of 
those shares "the trustee shall so advise grantor and sell 
the same if grantor approves of the sales terms." (Em-
phasis ours) (R.92) 
8. Paragraph VI. On sale of Chuck Wagon or An-
derson Enterprises stock by trustee, the proceeds of sale 
will become a part of the residue of the trust estate, 
which would be distributed on Mrs. Anderson's death to 
her grandson and her daughter under Paragraph IV(5) 
and (6) of the Trust Agreement (R.92). But, Mrs. An-
derson may indicate that the sale proceeds shall be sub-
stituted for the assets sold and ultimately distributed 
to the different distributees who would have received 
those shares of stock under Paragraph IV (3), (4), (5) 
and (6) of the Trust Agreement (R.92). In other words, 
Mrs. Anderson can vary at a future time the testament-
ary disposition of the trust assets. 
9. Paragraph VI. "So long as reasonably provident, 
Trustee shall vote stock held by it so as to maintain 
grantor as an officer, director and employee of An-
derson Enterprises, Inc., and Andy's Chuck Wagon Cor-
poration and related corporations," (R.92). 
10. Paragraph VII-9. Grantor may appoint a suc-
cessor trustee upon Valley Bank's resignation (R.93). 
11. Paragraph VIII . The Spendthrift provision pro-
vides "No payment or share of the Grantor or any 'Bene-
ficiary' shall in any manner be liable to the creditors 
thereof or subject to legal process, and the Trustee is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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directed in all events to make payments directly to grant-
or or Beneficiary or for their benefit." (R.94). 
We submit that under the Trust Agreement grantor 
has every lifetime use and benefit from the trust prop-
erty that she had before creating the trust, plus the 
protective and prudent hand of the trustee to guide her 
in her continuing business enterprises. Her high standard 
of living and enjoyment is directed to be continued by 
the trustee. She has continuing control of the family 
corporation affairs (R.171), including receipt of a gen-
erous salary from those corporations. (R.159-161). She 
has retained an option as to choice of the ultimate bene-
ficiaries on her death, in the event of liquidation of 
stocks; thus there was no possible vesting of those in-
terests. All of these uses and benefits of the trust assets 
are retained in Mrs. Anderson at the expense of her 
creditors, existing and subsequent, by way of the spend-
thrift provision (R.94). No other beneficiaries can have 
any uses or benefits until Mrs. Anderson's death. 
Appellants argue that the trustee has discretions as 
to payments or benefits to be made to Norma Ander-
son. However, appellants ignore the fact that the trustee 
is bound to consider and honor the matters for decision 
as retained by the grantor, namely, (1) request for a 
new automobile, (2) request to sell her residence, (3) 
change her place of residence, (4) her approval of sales 
of family stocks, and (5) her variance of disposition on 
her death of proceeds of sales of stocks. The trustee is 
directed to maintain the grantor in the same standard 
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of living as at the time of the creation of the trust. There 
was no real change in her enjoyment or the use of her 
properties. 
POINT III 
THE TRUST HAS, IN FACT, OPERATED 
FOR THE PRIMARY USE AND BENEFIT 
OF THE GRANTOR. 
Testimony of Mrs. Anderson and Rex Guymon, Val-
ley Bank trust officer, showed that the following dis-
bursements have been made to or for the use and benefit 
of Norma Anderson: 
1. $1,000.00 paid to Norma Anderson for her at-
torney's fee (R.176). 
2. $5,000.00 paid to Norma Anderson to pay a debt 
and to protect her interest in Chuck Wagon stock 
(R.176). 
3. $500.00 paid to Norma Anderson to buy a new 
automobile (R.177,182). 
4. Payment by trustee of taxes (R.181-182), insur-
ance and other expenses of maintenance, improvements 
(R.184) and mortgage payments (R.181-182) on the per-
sonal residence of Norma Anderson at 1050 Millbert Av-
enue (R.82). 
5. Mrs. Anderson has continued to have free use of 
her residence at 1050 Millbert Avenue. (R.183). 
6. A salary of betwen $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 per 
month has been paid directly to Norma Anderson by 
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Andy's Enterprises, o\^ u. uie corporations controlled 
by the trustee (R.161). 
An objective full view of the trust certainly shows 
that its purpose was to give the grantor all of the bene-
fits and uses of the trust property that she had before 
its creation. She has, in fact, used the residence by con-
tinuing to live there, with the trustee paying all expenses 
of its maintenance. She has continued to have all of the 
use of the family stocks by her personal control and sal-
ary provision, as provided in the Trust Agreement. She 
has all of the continuing uses and benefits during her 
lifetime. "Use", benefit" and "advantage" are shown 
as synonyms in Websters Third International Diction-
ary. Mrs. Anderson in addition was protected from the 
demands and indiscretions of her son, David, and from 
the rights of her creditors, existing and subsequent. 
We submit that Section 25-1-11 UCA in being en-
titled "Trust for Grantor" and in pointing at a "trust 
for the use of the person making the same" refers to 
"use" as in the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd 
Edition, p.1788: 
"The 'use' of a thing means that one is to enjoy,, 
hold, occupy, or have some manner of benefit 
thereof. Use also means usefulness, advantage, 
productive of benefit." 
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POINT IV 
BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIFIC SPEND-
THRIFT PROVISION, THE TRUST IS VOID 
AS TO RESPONDENT AS A CREDITOR 
OF THE GRANTOR 
The Anderson Trust Agreement specifically insul-
ates Mrs. Anderson and the trust property from her cred-
itors, past, present and future, with the following pro-
vision : 
"VIII. Spendthrift Provision. Neither Grant-
or nor any 'Beneficiary' of this trust shall have 
the power to anticipate, transfer, sell, assign or 
encumber any payment, distribution or interest 
in this trust, and any attempt to so do shall be.' 
. void and ineffective. No payment or share of the 
Grantor or any 'Beneficiary' shall in any manner 
be liable to the creditors thereof or subject to 
legal process, and the Trustee is directed in all 
events to make payments directly to the Grantor 
or 'Beneficiary' or for their benefit." (R.94). 
The law is clear and public policy is firmly opposed 
to the possibility of the beneficial owner of property 
placing that property beyond the reach of his creditors. 
A spendthrift trust for the benefit of the grantor him-
self is uniformly held entirely illegal, and the creditors 
can reach all of the trust property. 37 AmJur 2d 720, 
Sec.27. 
The general rule is stated at 89 C.J.S. 745, Section 
26: 
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"A spendthrift trust for the benefit of the donor, 
during life, is invalid, both as to past and future cred-
itors, (citing Nelson v. California Trust Co., and Green-
wich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A2d 
166 (1949), even though there is a provision for a con-
tingent remainder in a third person." 
Following are general statements of the rule: 
"A man cannot put his own property beyond the 
reach of creditors and at the same time reserve sub-
stantial interests in it or control over it." Griswold, 
Spendthrift Trusts, p.543. 
"The cases are uniform in holding that quite apart 
from statute, a person cannot create a spendthrift trust 
for himself which shall be effective against the rights 
of his subsequent creditors." 44 Harvard Law Review 
205 (Erwin Griswold). 
"Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts 
are permitted, the settlor cannot create a spendthrift 
trust for his own benefit. It is immaterial that in creat-
ing the trust the settlor did not intend to defraud his 
creditors. It is immaterial that he was solvent at the 
time of creation of the trust." Scott on Trusts, Vol. II, 
Sec. 156, p. 1092. 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (2d Ed.), Sec. 223, at 
p. 665, states: "If a settlor creates a trust for his own 
benefit and inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far 
as then existing or future creditors are concerned, and 
they can reach his interest under the trust." Cited are 
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McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc. and State ex reL v. 
Nashville Trust Co., both infra; also, Spring Street Corp. 
v. Walsh, 101 P.2d 783 (Calif., 1940). 
The above general statements of the law and public 
'policy are followed in many cases set out in the notes 
to 119 ALR 35 and 34 ALR 2d 1342. The cases cited 
uniformly hold that the grantor cannot by a direction 
to the trustee avoid or hinder his own creditors by a 
provision as in the Anderson Trust. 
Nelson v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 501, 202 
P.2d 1021 (1949), is a case on all fours with the Ander-
son Trust. The judgment creditor sought to reach the 
assets of a spendthrift trust created by his judgment 
debtor. The debtor contended that he had no interest in 
the property except to receive the net income and that 
the creditor was in no better position than he was. The 
California court held that all of the trust property was 
subject to the claim of the creditor, and it said: 
"It is against public policy to permit a man 
to tie up his property in such a way that he can 
enjoy it but prevent his creditors from reaching 
it, and where the settlor makes himself a benefic-
iary of a trust any restraints in the instrument 
on the involuntary alienation of his interest are 
invalid and ineffective." 
Cited with approval in the Nelson case is McColgan 
v. Walker Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 P. 995 (1916), 
where the California court held that a spendthrift trust 
attempted to be created in the settlor's own favor is in-
valid, even though he had no fraudulent intend toward 
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his creditors. See also In re Camm's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 
2d 104, 172 P.2d 547 (1946), and In State ex. rel. Cald-
well v. NasJiville Trust Co. 23 Tenn. App. 388, 190 SW 
2d 785 (1944). The Tennessee court distinguished a 
spendthrift trust for the benefit of third parties from 
a trust for the benefit of the grantor, saying: 
"But the case is very different when one 
takes his own property and undertakes to put 
it into a trust for his own benefit beyond the reach 
of his creditors. Such a trust would take from 
them what they would have had a right to look 
to for payment of their debts. I t violates not only 
the general principle that one's property is liable 
for his debts but also the law of fraudulent con-
veyance. All the authorities say that one cannot 
create a spendthrift trust with his own property 
for his own benefit." 
We have found no Utah law regarding spendthrift 
provisions which place the grantor 's property beyond 
the reach of his creditors. In Cronquist v. Utah State 
Agricultural College 114 U. 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949), 
the court had before it the propriety of a voluntary al-
ienation by a testamentary trust beneficiary, not the 
grantor. No creditors' rights were involved. The Utah 
court raised questions of semantics - what is a spend-
thrift trust and what language creates one? The court 
entirely by-passed the question of the validity of spend-
thrift trusts, particularly regarding the rights of cred-
itors of a grantor, in saying: 
"This opinion is not to be construed as a hold-
ing by implication that spendthrift trusts are 
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valid in Utah to any extent. As to that question, 
we express no opinion. I t must await an occasion 
where a spendthrift trust was intended to be 
created." 
There are two separate facets to the spendthrift 
trust. We are not questioning the right to make property 
not subject to voluntary alienation. The other facet, the 
provision for the shield against creditors, we do at-
tack and contend is illegal. We are not suggesting 
that the entire trust agreement is invalid because of the 
spendthrift provision, as Appellants suggest (Ap.Br. 
9,22). The grantor can do ultimately whatever she wishes 
with her property, but she cannot beat her creditors by 
a secret trust, or with a direction to the trustee not to 
pay her creditors. There will be no revolution in the 
trust business after this decision as Appellants suggest 
(Ap.Br.22), only an affirmation of the rights of cred-
itors. 
The general rule as to creditors' rights is refined 
in ALI Restatement of Trusts 2nd Sec. 156, p. 326, as 
follows: 
"156 W H E R E THE SETTLOR IS A BENE-
FICIARY. 
(1) Where a person creates for his own 
benefit a trust with a provision restraining the 
voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, 
his transferee or creditors can reach his inter-
ests. 
(2) Where a person creates for his own 
benefit a trust for support or a discretionary 
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trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the 
maximum amount which the trustee under the 
terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for 
his benefit." 
The very inclusion of the spendthrift provision in 
avoidance of grantor's creditors makes the trust fraud-
ulent and invalid as to subsequent creditors and a part 
of a scheme with a clear purpose of placing property 
beyond the reach of his creditors. See 93 ALR 1213. In 
the Anderson Trust the spendthrift provision is express-
ly for the protection and insulation of the grantor as 
against her own creditors. By the terms of the trust all 
of the assets can be used and have been used for the 
benefit of the grantor, and the entire trust is void as 
against respondent as a creditor of the grantor. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS NOT BARRED, EITHER 
UNDER SECTION 25-1-11 UCA OR THE 
SPENDTHRIFT P R O V I S I O N , BY ANY 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Appellants argued that respondent should in some 
way be barred by the three year limitation in Section 
78-12-26(4) UCA which provides: 
"(4) An action for a liability created by the stat-
utes of this state, other than for a penalty or for-
feiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescrib-
ed by the statutes of this state." 
They urge that respondent should have made in-
vestigation to determine whether Mrs. Anderson had di-
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vested herself of her assets into a trust and finally that 
recording of the Anderson deeds to the trustee should 
have given constructive notice to respondent and there-
by bar him. 
Section 78-12-26(4) UCA is in no way applicable 
to respondent's cause of action under Section 25-1-11 
UCA. That statute does not create a cause of action or 
liability within the meaning of Sec. 75-12-26(4). Sec. 
25-1-11 UCA simply declares certain transactions void. 
Respondent commenced his action, both under Sec. 
25-1-11 UCA and to avoid the spendthrift trust provision 
as soon as he had information regarding the existence 
of the trust and when he found he could not collect his 
prior judgment otherwise personally from Mrs. Ander-
son. The Anderson Trust was indeed a secret trust, as 
shown by the testimony of Rex Guymon, Valley Bank 
trust officer, that even if respondent had called the bank 
inquiring as to the existence of any trust with Mrs. An-
derson, respondent would not have been advised if any-
one, including Mrs. Anderson, had a trust, because of 
the policy of the bank (R.184). 
The record shows that the Anderson real property 
was, in fact, transferred to NAVALCO, the nominee of 
of the Trustee, with no designation of NAVALCO as a 
trustee for anyone (R.175,184). Recording of those deeds 
could not possibly be construed as notice to respondent 
of the existence of a trust as to either real or personal 
property. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Sawaya should be affirmed in his decision 
that: 
1. The Anderson Trust Agreement was, in fact? for 
the use and benefit of Norma Anderson, the grantor. 
2. As to personal property, therein, the Trust 
Agreement is void under Sec. 25-1-11 UCA as to re-
spondent as a creditor of the grantor. 
3. Because of the spendthrift provision in the Trust 
Agreement, the trust is void as to respondent as a cred-
itor of the grantor. 
4. Judgment for $14,680.68, interest and costs 
should be affirmed to respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
JAMES W. BELESS 
WALLACE D. HURD 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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